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ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ... SOME?:
CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOL
LEGISLATION AFTER DOE NO. 1 V. SECRETARY

OF EDUCATION'
"The funds availablefor public education on the whole have shrunk
dramaticallyover the past decade. Available data suggests that the decline
correlates with the expansion of choice and that the overallpot of public
education funding, even if charters were included, is shrinking. In other
words, states' choicepolicies are not simply robbingPeterto pay Paul. They
are robbing Peter under the auspices of giving it all to Paul, but actually
shaving a chunk off ofpublic educationfunding and leaving Peter andPaul
to fight one another. The push for choice makes the rusepossible."2

INTRODUCTION:
In 1635, Boston, Massachusetts became the birthplace of the United
States' first public school.3 Fast forward almost four hundred years, and
access to a free, public education has become commonplace.' Though the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the right to an education is
not a fundamental right granted by the United States Constitution, the Court
still recognizes public education as one of society's most important
institutions, vital for the developmental growth and success of its citizens.'
1 95 N.E.3d 241 (Mass. 2018).
2 See Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits, 103
CORNELL

3

L. REv. 1360, 1391-92 (2018).

See Apr 23, 1635 CE: FirstPublic School in America, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 16, 2013),

https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/apr23/first-public-school-americal
school was established in Boston, Massachusetts).

(stating first public

4 See Derek W. Black, The CongressionalFailureto Enforce Equal Protection Through the

Elementary and SecondaryEducation Act, 90 B.U. L. REv. 313, 335 (2010) ("All fifty states have

constitutional clauses that guarantee students a public education . . . ."); Emily Parker, 50-State
Review: Constitutional Obligationsfor Public Education, EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES 1, 1
(Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-publiceducation-l.pdf ("Within the constitution of each of the 50 states, there is language that mandates
the creation of a public education system.").
5 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that education
is not fundamental right by restating continued importance of education); see also Plyler v. Doe,
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Inherent in the assertion that education is necessary to cultivate a productive
society is the notion that where public education is available, everyone
should be afforded equal access to its proffered benefits. 6 But, the public
education system in the United States is not without its flaws, and many
school districts throughout the country lack sufficient funding to provide
students with what is deemed to be an "adequate" education.
In an effort to remedy the inequities in some of these struggling
districts, education reformers have turned to charter schools as one possible
solution.' Still, whether charter schools are the solution to the problematic
state of traditional public school systems remains a hotly contested subject

457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (stating belief that education plays important and necessary role in
society); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.").
6 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("[Education], where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."); see also Black, supra note 4, at 316
("[W]hen a state fails to carry out its state-based educational obligations it not only violates its state
constitution, it often also violates federal equal protection.").
7 See William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls ofthe Next Generationof
EducationalRights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1904-07 (2017) (outlining history of
case law addressing state requirements that education be "adequate"); see also Black, supra note
2, at 1365 ("[E]ducation clauses in state constitutions create a state duty to provide adequate and
equitable public schools."); Derek W. Black, Averting EducationalCrisis: FundingCuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to PublicEducation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 42326 (2016) (describing severe funding shortages in various public education systems).
8 See 1 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 3.11, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2018)
("Education reform ... has involved a demand for greater choice among public schools because of
a growing concern that existing public schools were not meeting legitimate public expectations.");
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation ofEducation Law, 70
VAND. L. REv. 1, 4-8 (2017) (summarizing development of school choice programs); Jennifer
Reboul Rust, Investing in Integration:A Casefor "Promoting Diversity " in FederalEducation
Funding Priorities,59 Loy. L. REV. 623, 625 (2013) ("Frustration with the tragic state of public
education over the past few decades has generated robust experimentation with alternatives to
traditional public schooling.... Of the school choice concepts in circulation, Americans have
become most enchanted by the charter school movement.").
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of debate.9 Consequentially, there are a growing number of challenges to the
constitutionality of charter school legislation."o
This Note seeks to explore certain constitutional challenges brought
by charter school opponents and the viability of future challenges to
Massachusetts charter school law." Though the plaintiffs in Doe No. 1 v.
Secretary ofEducation, a recent challenge to the constitutionality of certain
Massachusetts charter school legislation, were charter school proponents
seeking to expand the creation of charter schools in Massachusetts, this case
will become the focal point of the following discussion as it may prove to be
a vital guide for future plaintiffs who believe they have a case against the
Massachusetts charter school system.12 But, before turning to the case law,
it is necessary to discuss some of the legal history surrounding the right to
an education under the United States Constitution as compared to state

9 See Robert J. Martin, Chartingthe Court Challenges to CharterSchools, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 43, 43-47 (2004) ("One of the most controversial developments in public education during
the past decade has been the establishment of charter schools."); see also Derek W. Black, Charter
Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 445-53 (expounding on
areas of focus in national charter school "conversation"); Erin Aubry Kaplan, School Choice is the
2018),
14,
(Aug.
TIMES
N.Y.
Justice,
of
Enemy
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/charter-schools-desegregation-los-angeles.html
(opining that charter schools are "resegregating" students); David Leonhardt, A Pleafor a Fact22,
2018),
TIMES
(July
Schools,
N.Y.
About
Charter
Based
Debate
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/opinion/education-reform-charter-schools-neworleans.html ("There are two high-profile camps on education reform. Staunch defenders.. [and]
[o]n the other side, the harshest critics of reform . . . ."); Valerie Strauss, Problems With Charter
Schools That You Won't Hear Betsy DeVos Talk About, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/22/problems-with-charteron
(reporting
schools-that-you-wont-hear-betsy-devos-talk-about/?utm term-.ffd8ffb9dl 07
certain downfalls of charter schools); Press Release, NAACP, Statement Regarding the NAACP's
(Oct.
15,
2016),
Charter
Schools
on
on
a
Moratorium
Resolution
https://www.naacp.org/latest/statement-regarding-naacps-resolution-moratorium-charter-schools/
(declaring opposition to charter school expansion).
1o See Martin, supra note 9, at 45 ("In pursuing their struggle against charter schools,
adversaries have utilized both state and federal court systems."); see, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85
F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying request for injunction preventing opening of new charter
school); Save Our Sch.-Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500 (HHK), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45081, at *4-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (describing D.C. school districts in dire straits); Doe No. 1,
95 N.E.3d at 244 (dismissing claim that state's cap on number of charter schools was
unconstitutional); League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1141 (Wash. 2015)
(holding state charter school funding statute unconstitutional); Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 747 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting allegation that California charter schools
were unconstitutional).
" See infra notes 57-166 (summarizing failures and successes of prior charter school
litigation).
12 95 N.E.3d at 252-59 (outlining requirements for stating claim under certain provisions of
Massachusetts Constitution).
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constitutions, to describe what makes a charter school a charter school, and
to explain how these schools are typically funded.13

THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION:
In the landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education, a unanimous
Supreme Court took a strong stance in favor of providing all of the country's
children with equal access to an education.14 The Court opined,
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."
The Court implied, however, that the right to an education is only
guaranteed in states that have implemented a public education system.16 The
Court later clarified this implication and held that although its "dedication to
public education" has remain unchanged since Brown, education is not a
fundamental right granted by the United States Constitution.' 7 But, if a state
grants its citizens the right to a public education, all of its citizens must be
afforded equal access to the state's education system.' 8
13 See infra notes 14-35 (briefing constitutional right to education and defining charter

schools).
14 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (detailing importance of obtaining education).
"s See id at 493.
16 See id ("Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which

must be made available to all on equal terms.").
17 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 30 ("[T]he importance of a service performed
by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental . . . ."); see also Plyler,
457 U.S. at 221 (affirming determination that public education is not constitutionally protected
right.). But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]here
can be no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral
process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. This
being so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny .... .").
" See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (finding exclusion of undocumented immigrant children from
public schools unconstitutional under Fourteenth Amendment). After an in-depth discussion of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plyler Court concluded, "Ifthe State is
to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children
residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some
substantial state interest." Id.; see also, Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled From Education:Plyler v.
Doe's Impact on the ConstitutionalityofLong-Term Suspensions and Expulsions, 101 VA. L. REV.

763, 778 (2015) ("Plyler'sreasoning, combined with Brown, suggests the possibility of a right of
equal access to education under the Equal Protection Clause."). "While there is no absolute right
to education, Plyler implies that it is constitutionally problematic for states to exclude discrete
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Today, all fifty state constitutions include provisions mandating
statewide public education systems. 19 Generally, these constitutional
provisions have been interpreted to guarantee that the applicable state's
public education system will provide its students with an "adequate" level of
education.2 0 This theory that state constitutions guarantee an adequate level
of education emerged in cases addressing disparities between the quality of
education provided by different districts as a direct result of the state's school
funding scheme.2 1 However, unless state courts have defined "adequate" in
the context of public education, its meaning can be difficult to discern. 2 2 This
quest for assuring the provision of adequate educational opportunities has
helped catalyze the charter school movement, but it is also the foundation for
the argument that the creation of charter schools prevents traditional public
schools from providing adequate levels of education.23

groups of students from public schools once a system of free education is offered to all." Id.; Cf
Black, supra note 9, at 447 ("Public education entails the provision of common experiences under
conditions consistent with equal protection, due process, free speech, and religious neutrality.").
19 See Parker, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that all fifty states have mandated "the creation of'
public education systems); see also Black, supra note 2, at 1403 ("A right to education and states'
duty to deliver it are embedded in all fifty state constitutions.").
20 See Black, supra note 2, at 1405 ("[C]ourts have held that state constitutions guarantee
students access to a quality or an 'adequate' education."); see also Koski, supra note 7, at 1904-07
(outlining educational finance reform litigation and use of terms "equal" and "adequate"); Diana
Pullin, Ensuring an Adequate Education: Opportunity to Learn, Law, and Social Science, 27 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 83, 96 (2007) (stating many courts have interpreted state constitutions to
provide "adequate" level of education).
21 See Koski, supra note 7, at 1904 (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186,
205-13) (Ky. 1989)) ("The third wave of educational finance litigation was launched in 1989 when
the Kentucky Supreme Court found in the education article of its state constitution not an
entitlement to educational equity, but rather an entitlement to a defined level of educational
quality."); see also Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School FinanceLitigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1175 (1995) ("Adequacy litigation
seeks additional educational resources for those school districts failing to provide a constitutionally
adequate education.").
22 See Note, The Misguided Appeal of a Minimally Adequate Education, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1458 (2017) ("What constitutes a 'minimally adequate education' and what role courts should
play in determining the contours of minimum adequacy continue to be matters of considerable
disagreement."). "[A]dequacy suits inevitably require courts to define 'adequacy.' This is no easy
task for policymakers and academic experts, much less for judges." Id at 1468.
23 Compare Rapp, supra note 8, at [1] (stating reason for charter schools is concern regarding
quality of existing education), and Kevin S. Huffman, Note, CharterSchools, Equal Protection
Litigation, andthe New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1290 (1998) ("As the
quality of public education, particularly in large urban school districts, has declined, activists and
politicians from all points on the political spectrum have proposed school reforms."), with Black,
supra note 2, at 1363 ("From the perspective of the local urban district, the effects [of school choice]
range from existential threats to serious impediments to equal and adequate education.").
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What Is A CharterSchool?
Charter schools are independently operated schools authorized by
statutes that vary from state to state.24 Despite these variations, charter
schools across the board do share characteristics relevant to understanding
how they typically differ from "traditional public schools." 25 First, charter
schools are independent from public school districts as they are operated by
nonprofit organizations, private corporations, teachers, parents, and a
number of other groups. 26 They are publicly funded, tuition free schools that
are governed by charter agreements, which are contracts between the school
and an agency designated to authorize the school.2 7 These agreements
outline the conditions of operation, renewal, and other rights and
responsibilities of the parties including the school's performance
expectations.2 8 Depending on the state, "authorizers" will take different
forms including, but not limited to certain government agencies, educational
entities, local school boards, or nonprofit private entities. 2 9 Additionally,
charter schools are not required to comply with many of the state and local
regulations imposed on "traditional" public schools, such as those pertaining
to curriculum, staffing, and budget, among others.30
Students are not "assigned" to attend charter schools, but rather,
students choose to attend as an alternative to the available "traditional"

24 See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy ofSchool Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2073-74 (2002) (describing differences between charter schools and "traditional" public
schools); see also Kate Gallen, Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in CharterSchools' Policies,
77 Mo. L. REv. 1121, 1126 (2012) (characterizing charter schools and how they are operated).
25 See sources cited supra note 24 (listing aspects common to most charter schools).
26 See Gamett, supra note 8, at 14 (describing "charter authorizers"); Gallen, supra note 24, at
1126 (listing entities that operate charter schools).
27 See Ryan & Heise, supra note 24, at 2073 (defining charter agreements).
28 See Katherine E. Lehnen, School Inequality: Challenges and Solutions: Allen Chair Issue
2016, Chartingthe Course: CharterSchool Explorationin Virginia, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 841
(2016) (quoting Leland Ware & Cara Robinson, Charters, Choice, and Resegregation, 11 DEL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2009)) ("Charter agreements typically outline the school's 'mission, program, goals,
students served, methods of assessment, and ways to measure success."'); see also CharterSchool
FAQ, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2018), https://www.publiccharters.org/about-

charter-schools/charter-school-faq (providing information regarding charter agreements); Charter
School

Contracts, NAT'L

ASS'N

OF

CHARTER

SCH.

AUTHORIZERS

(Oct.

2009),

https://www.qualitycharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/PolicyGuideCharterSchoolContracts_2009.10.pdf (detailing specific
aspects of charter school agreements).
29 See sources cited supra note 26 (noting examples of agencies which may be deemed charter
school "authorizers").
30 See sources cited supranote 26 (discussing ways in which charter schools are granted more

freedom than public schools).
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public schools.3 1 Charter schools are technically open to all students and
typically do not require applicants to meet eligibility standards such as prior
academic performance or test scores.3 2 But, enrollment is often limited by
statute, and when a charter school reaches capacity, it will begin to admit
applicants at random through a lottery, and ultimately many applicants are
unable to enroll.33 Further, a number of states do allow charter schools to
give preference to certain applicants, such as siblings of students who already
attend the school and children of the school's founders and employees.3 4
Charter schools are also granted more freedom than "traditional" public
schools when it comes to student discipline and are able to exclude students
whose behavior would not otherwise justify expulsion.s

CharterSchools in Massachusetts
Massachusetts charter schools "ha[ve] the freedom to organize
around a core mission, curriculum, theme, and/or teaching method and [they]
control [their] own budget and hire (and fire) teachers and staff."36 In

&

31 See Lehnen, supra note 28, at 842 ("Charters provide parents and students with educational
choice, which is especially meaningful to those students who would otherwise not have such
choice.").
32 See Jeanette M. Curtis, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School Funding and
Strategies for Achieving Equal to Public School Funds, 55 How. L.J. 1057, 1064-65 (2012)
("Charter Schools are not allowed to screen student acceptance or select students based on certain
criteria. . . ."); see also Gallen, supranote 24, at 1142-43 (stating typical charter school admissions
processes).
33 See Gallen, supra note 24, at 1126 ("If more students apply than a charter school has space
for, the school must institute a lottery system . . . ."); CharterSchool FAQ, supra note 28 (claiming
charter school lotteries are completely random). But see Garnett, supra note 8, at 13 ("[S]ome
[charter schools] are permitted to prefer neighborhood students and/or to test applicants for
admission."); Valerie Strauss, How CharterSchools Choose DesirableStudents, WASH. POST (Feb.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/16/how-charter16, 2013),
schools-choose-desirable-students/?utm term=.9cfe2278a781 (bringing attention to charter
schools' use of selective enrollment procedures).
34 See Clear Student Enrollment and Lottery Procedures, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
(2018),
https://www.publiccharters.org/our-work/charter-lawSCHS.
CHARTER
database/components/12 (providing synopsis of admissions processes for every state).
3 See Black, supra note 2, at 1383 ("[C]harters have far more leeway to exclude students once
they are enrolled.").
36 See Questions and Answers About Charter Schools, MASS. DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY
SECONDARY EDUC., 1, 1, http://www.doe.mass.eduicharter/about.html (follow "Questions and
Answers about Charter Schools in Massachusetts hyperlink under "Additional resources") (last
updated May 2018) (simplifying Massachusetts' charter school statute).
The purposes of establishing charter schools are: (i) to stimulate the development of
innovative programs within public education; (ii) to provide opportunities for innovative
learning and assessments; (iii) to provide parents and students with greater options in
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Massachusetts, there are two categories of charter schools: Commonwealth
charter schools and Horace Mann charter schools.3 7 Both Commonwealth
and Horace Mann charter schools are governed by a board of trustees, they
operate independently of any school committee, and their charter agreements
must be approved by the Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education (the "Board"). 38 If approved, the charter agreements remain in
place for five years.39 At the end of the five year term, a school's agreement
may be renewed if it has attracted students and produced "positive results"
during the initial five year term.40 The main difference between Horace
Mann charter schools and Commonwealth charter schools is that, in addition
to approval by the Board, Horace Mann charter schools must also be
approved by the local school committee and, in certain cases, the local
teacher's union.41

For each student who attends a Commonwealth charter school, the
school receives a "tuition payment" from the state equal to the amount that
selecting schools within and outside their school districts; (iv) to provide teachers with
a vehicle for establishing schools with alternative, innovative methods of educational
instruction and school structure and management; (v) to encourage performance-based
educational programs; (vi) to hold teachers and school administrators accountable for
students' educational outcomes; and (vii) to provide models for replication in other
public schools.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71 § 89(c) (LexisNexis 2018).
3 See Questions and Answers About Charter Schools, supra note 36, at 1 (responding to
frequently asked questions regarding Massachusetts charter schools).
3 See id. (defining basic tenets ofMassachusetts charter schools).
39 See id. (stating term length of charter agreements in Massachusetts).
40 See id. (listing Massachusetts' charter school renewal conditions).
41 See id. (noting difference between two types of Massachusetts charter schools); see also
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71 § 89(c) (LexisNexis 2018) (classifying Massachusetts charter schools
into two broad categories); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.04 (2015) (providing procedures for creating
new charter schools). There are three types of Horace Mann charter schools: Horace Mann I,
Horace Mann II, and Horace Mann III. Questions andAnswers About CharterSchools, supranote
36, at 2. Horace Mann I and Horace Mann III charter schools are both newly created schools, while
Horace Mann H charter schools are existing schools that are converted into charter schools. Id. A
Horace Mann I charter school must be approved by the Board, the local teacher's union, and the
school committee in its respective school district. Id. Any modifications to a collective bargaining
agreement must be submitted with the school's initial application and "must be approved by the
school committee and collective bargaining unit." Id. Horace Mann II charter schools must also be
approved by the Board and the local school committee, and any modifications to "a collective
bargaining agreement must be approved by a majority of faculty at the school, with the vote to be
held within [thirty] days of submission of the application." Id. Likewise, Horace Mann III charter
schools must be approved by the Board and the local school committee, but "an agreement with the
local collective bargaining unit is not required prior to Board approval, however, the charter
school's board of trustees must negotiate with the collective bargaining unit and the school
committee in good faith regarding any modifications to collective bargaining agreements following
the award of a charter." Id. Additionally, at least four Horace Mann I1l schools must be located in
Boston. Id.
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the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
("DESE") deems to be the cost of educating one student; this is referred to
as the "per-pupil amount."4 2 The state then deducts this per-pupil amount
from the aid received by the school district (the "sending district) where the
student would have otherwise attended.43 Simply put, the state reallocates
funding from the sending district to the Commonwealth charter school(s) in
an amount equal to the per-pupil expense multiplied by the number of
students in the sending district that have chosen instead to attend a charter
school." Commonwealth charter schools are also eligible to receive funding
through federal and state grants, and they may also apply for private grants
and receive contributions.4 5
Horace Mann charter school funding "comes directly from the
in which the school is located, through a memorandum of
district
school
understanding with the district." 46 During the first year of operation, Horace
Mann applications "may specify a total budget allocation" that has been
approved by the local school committee, and "each year thereafter, the board
of trustees ... will submit a budget request for the following year to the
superintendent and school committee under the district."4 7 These schools
48
may also apply for private grants and receive individual contributions.
Massachusetts also imposes a limitation on the number of charter
schools that are permitted to operate at one time. 49 This limitation is
commonly referred to as the "cap" on charter schools and restricts the total
number of charter schools to 120 (48 Horace Mann charter schools and 72

42 See Questions and Answers About Charter Schools, supra note 36, at 9 (providing
description of Commonwealth Charter School funding method).
43 See id. (explaining per-pupil funding reallocation).
4 See id. (summarizing funding formula for Commonwealth charter schools).
45 See id. (detailing Commonwealth charter schools' ability to receive certain grants).
4 See id. (explaining funding method for Horace Mann charter schools).
47 See Questions andAnswers About CharterSchools, supra note 36, at 9 (summarizing budget
requests at Horace Mann charter schools).
Under the law, a Horace Mann charter school cannot receive less than it would have
under the district's standard budgetary allocation rules. A school may appeal a
disproportionately lower budget allocation to the Commissioner [of Elementary and
Secondary Education]. Depending upon the terms of its charter and the memorandum of
understanding, a Horace Mann charter school may receive its share of federal and state
grant funds from the district or receive funds directly.
Id.
48 See id (detailing Massachusetts charter Horace Mann charter schools' ability to receive
certain grants).
49 See id. at 5 (stating that there is limitation on number of charter schools permitted in
Massachusetts).
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Commonwealth charter schools).5 o Further, "no public school district's total
charter school tuition payment to [C]ommonwealth charter schools shall
exceed [nine] per cent of the district's net school spending.""
If all of the seats at a charter school are filled, applicants to that
school will be placed on a waiting list, and the school will hold an admissions
lottery to fill any open spaces that become available. 52 However,
Commonwealth charter schools do give preference to siblings of students
who already attend the school and to applicants who live in the city or town
in which the charter school is located.53 In an initial lottery, Horace Mann
charter schools give first priority to "students attending said school, or
attending school in the school building previously occupied by said school,
on the date that the final [charter school] application is filed with the
50 See id. (specifying Massachusetts' "cap" on number of permitted charter
schools); see also
Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 244 (using the term "cap" in reference to limitation on Massachusetts
charter schools). There is one exception to the cap, which is as follows:

In any fiscal year, if the board determines based on student performance data collected
pursuant to section II, said district is in the lowest 10 per cent of all statewide student
performance scores released in the 2 consecutive school years before the date the charter
school application is submitted, the school district's total charter school tuition payment
to commonwealth charter schools may exceed 9 per cent of the district's net school
spending but shall not exceed 18 per cent. For a district qualifying under this paragraph
whose charter school tuition payments exceed 9 per cent of the school district's net
school spending, the board shall only approve an application for the establishment of a
commonwealth charter school if an applicant, or a provider with which an applicant
proposes to contract, has a record of operating at least 1 school or similar program that
demonstrates academic success and organizational viability and serves student
populations similar to those the proposed school seeks to serve, from the following
categories of students, those: (i) eligible for free lunch; (ii) eligible for reduced price
lunch; (iii) that require special education; (iv) English learners or of similar language
proficiency level as measured by a standardized English proficiency assessment chosen
by the department; (v) sub-proficient, which shall mean students who have scored in the
"needs improvement", "warning" or "failing" categories on the mathematics or English
language arts exams of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System for 2 of
the past 3 years or as defined by the department using a similar measurement; (vi) who
are designated as at risk of dropping out of school based on predictors determined by the
department; (vii) who have dropped out of school; or (viii) other at-risk students who
should be targeted to eliminate achievement gaps among different groups of students.
For a district approaching its net school spending cap, the board shall give preference to
applications from providers building networks of schools in more than 1 municipality.
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 71 § 89(i)(3) (LexisNexis 2018).
s1 See Questions and Answers About Charter Schools, supra note 36, at 5 (stating
Massachusetts' charter school spending cap). The nine per cent tuition payment cap may increase
to 18 percent. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 71, § 89(i)(3) (LexisNexis 2018).
52 See MASS. ANN LAWS ch. 71, § 89(n) (LexisNexis 2018) (listing permissible, and
sometimes mandated, Massachusetts charter school admissions preferences).
s3 See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.05(6) (2015) (summarizing Commonwealth charter schools'
enrollment and application processes).
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Board."5 4 Then, priority is given to "siblings attending said school, or
attending school in the school building previously occupied by said school,
on the date that the final [charter school] application is filed with the
Board."" In subsequent lotteries, Horace Mann charter schools prioritize
siblings of students who already attend the charter school, students who are
enrolled in the public schools in the district where the Horace Mann school
is located, and students who live in the city or town where the charter school
is located.56 Thus, despite an ultimately "random" lottery, some applicants
will have an increased chance of enrollment as compared to those who are
not given preference.5 7

An Overview ofPast Challenges to the Constitutionalityof CharterSchools

'

Charter schools' growing presence in the United States' public
education system is no doubt controversial, polarizing those in favor of
school choice and those who contest its efficacy." Unsurprisingly, this
9
debate has made its way to the courtroom. Much of the litigation in this
area has been initiated by charter school opponents claiming that the creation
of charter schools will ultimately deprive students of equal access to an
adequate level of education in contravention of certain state constitutional
rights. 60 Because education is not a fundamental right granted by the United
6
States Constitution, most of these claims have been litigated in state courts.

54 See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.05(7) (2015) (specifying admissions preferences to be used
by Horace Mann charter schools).
5 See id. (detailing admissions preferences used by Horace Mann charter schools).
56 See id. (expanding on Horace Mann charter school admissions processes).
5 See id. (providing list of all admissions preferences used by Massachusetts charter schools).
5 See sources cited supra note 9 (asserting charter school debate has become increasingly
controversial).
5 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 483 (10th Cir. 1996) (determining whether
schools were closed with discriminatory intent); Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 61 (D.D.C.
2014) (finding no merit in claim that school closure plan was discriminatory); Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d
at 244-45 (dismissing claims asserting Massachusetts charter school cap was unconstitutional).
6 See, e.g., Smith, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (dismissing claim that charter school expansion is
discriminatory); Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 484 (holding no equal protection violation after public
school closures and subsequent charter school expansion); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ.
About Parochiaid v. Governor, 566 N.W.2d 208, 216-22 (Mich. 1997) (addressing allegation that
Michigan's charter school act was unconstitutional); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of
Englewood Palisades Charter Sch., 727 A.2d 15, 20-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (describing
three public school districts' challenges to New Jersey's charter school act).
61 See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 35 ("Education, of course, is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.").

2019]

MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOL LEGISLATION

57

There are, however, a handful of federal cases that have addressed this issue
in the context of equal protection.6 2
At the federal level, equal protection claims have continuously
failed, as plaintiffs have been unable to present strong evidence that the
charter schools at issue were created with a discriminatory intent.63
Challenges to the constitutionality of charter school laws brought at the state
level have also been largely unsuccessful, and though they do differ from the
federal claims, they are often dismissed for similar reasons.64 Furthermore,
to succeed on such claims in the future, these past failures cannot be
ignored.65 The following summarizes two federal cases in which plaintiffs
contested the expansion of local charter schools on the basis of equal
protection.66 Each case highlights the need for specific evidence of
discrimination and confirms that conclusory arguments are unlikely to hold
up in a court of law.67
In Villanueva v. Carere, a Colorado school board elected to close
two public schools just three months after approving the opening of a new
charter school.68 Parents of students who attended those public schools
sought to enjoin the school closings, claiming that the school board violated
62 See Smith, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (finding no evidence of discrimination); Save Our Sch.-Se.
& Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500 (HHK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45081, at *1 (D.D.C.
July 3, 2006) (analyzing equal protection claims alleging charter schools in D.C. were
discriminatory), aff d, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 486 (holding that
no equal protection violation occurred).
63 See cases cited supra note 62 (failing to succeed on claims of equal protection); see also
Martin, supra note 9, at 100 ("In these federal cases plaintiffs have consistently failed in their
attempts to establish that state charter school programs have violated constitutional provisions or

other federal law.").
64 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d
1148, 1166 (Ohio 2006) (rejecting allegations that Ohio charter schools were unconstitutional); In
re GrantofCharterSch. Application ofEnglewoodPalisadesCharterSch., 727 A.2d at 20 (finding
"none of the challenges advanced by appellant districts persuasive"); Council of Orgs. & Others
for Educ. About Parochiaid,566 N.W.2d at 222 (upholding constitutionality of Michigan's charter
school act); see also Black, supra note 2, at 1409 ("With the exception of the Washington Supreme
Court, high courts have rejected these [constitutional] challenges [to charter school
programs] . . . ."); Martin, supra note 9, at 102 ("The state and federal courts have shown almost
unwavering constancy in rejecting the challenges brought by school boards and other adversaries
against the opening or continued operation of charter schools.").
65 See Black, supra note 2, at 1408-11 (analyzing why past charter school cases have failed
and proposing ways to improve future outcomes).
6 See Smith, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (dismissing equal protection claims); Villanueva, 85 F.3d at
484 (finding no equal protection violations).
67 See cases cited supra note 62 (holding evidence insufficient to establish valid equal
protection claims). "[C]laims must become far more factually granular. Plaintiffs cannot assume
that choice programs inherently harm public education." Black, supranote 2, at 1416.
68 See 85 F.3d at 483-86 (analyzing equal protection claims brought
by parents whose
children's schools were closed).
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69
their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. This
equal protection claim was based on the plaintiffs' assertion that the closings
were motivated by the intent to discriminate against Hispanic students, as the
student population at the schools elected to close was predominantly
Hispanic.7 0
For the claim to succeed, the plaintiffs in Villanueva not only had to
show that the schools were closed in furtherance of a "racially discriminatory
intent or purpose," but also that the discriminatory purpose was the
"motivating factor in the decision."n The plaintiffs presented no direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, though the court acknowledged that equal
protection claims require a "sensitive inquiry" into both direct and
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.7 2 In light of the lower
court's finding that the school board's decisions were made in a "sincere"
effort to improve the overall quality of education, and this court's own
finding that the members of the school board and the school superintendent
were Hispanic and had a history of commitment to the Hispanic and minority
communities in the district, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence of a discriminatory intent.73 The court also found that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that the closures had a discriminatory impact on the
Hispanic students, noting that approximately fifty percent of the students
projected to attend the charter schools were Hispanic, a proportion nearly
74
identical to the percentage of Hispanic students within the entire district.
Last, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Colorado's
Charter Schools Act's use of the phrase "cultural factors" in its definition of
"at-risk pupils" was code for "ethnic minority" and therefore created a
suspect classification.75 The court was sensitive to the parents' concerns, but
found that after a reading of the entire statute, it did not seem to create any
classification of students, and even included an express mandate that charter
schools' enrollment decisions "be made in a nondiscriminatory manner. "76
In Smith v. Henderson, several schools in Washington D.C.'s public
school system were under-enrolled, and in an effort to use resources more

See
7o See
71 See
72 See
69

id.
id.
id.
id.

at 483-84 (stating constitutional claims to be reviewed).
at 485 (summarizing school closure plan).
(asserting requirements for proving racially discriminatory intent and purpose).
at 486 (finding no direct evidence of discriminatory intent).

73 See id. (justifying determination that there was no evidence of discriminatory intent).
74 See Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 487 (opining that population data revealed lack of discriminatory
impact).
7 See id. at 488 (summarizing plaintiffs' reasons for asserting statute created suspect
classification).
76 See id. (disagreeing with plaintiffs' characterization of suspect classification).
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efficiently, the district began to create and implement a school closure plan.77
Parents of students who attended public schools closed under the plan filed
a complaint alleging that the closings were discriminatory and violated the
Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection clause. 78 They set forth a few reasons
for why the closure plan was discriminatory, one being that its purpose was
"to make room for charters."7 9 They posited that "making room" for charters
was discriminatory because "reforms like charter schools .. . will ultimately
harm black students in the District."so The court made note of aspects of the
plaintiffs' brief that revealed their evident distaste for charter schools, and
explained that questions of policy are political issues, and not legal issues to
be resolved by ajudge." It then pointed to the fact that the plaintiffs offered
no explanation for why charter school expansion was discriminatory beyond
their allegation that it would "ultimately harm black students," nor did they
"offer[] [any] real evidence that their schools were actually closed to make
way for charters." 82 As a result of the plaintiffs' generalized and opinionated
assertions about charter school policy, and the absence of any actual
evidence of discrimination, the court concluded that no reasonable jury
would find an equal protection violation, and dismissed the claim.83
At the state level, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of
charter school statutes frequently focused on charter school funding.'
Specifically, they argued that it is unconstitutional for a state to reallocate
traditional public school funds for charter school use.s Despite the
7

See 54 F. Supp. at 61 (providing background regarding plaintiffs' complaint).

78 See id at 68-69 (addressing equal protection claims).

7

See id. at 72 (discussing claim that charter school expansion was discriminatory).
so See id. at 61 (pointing to plaintiffs' only justification for discrimination claim).
81 See id. at 67 (criticizing aspects of plaintiffs' argument that relied on policy opinions).
82 See Smith, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (finding no evidence of discrimination caused by charter
school expansion).
83 See id. at 73 ("[N]o reasonable jury could find an Equal Protection ... violation here.")
" See, e.g., Iberville Parish Sch. Bd. v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 248
So.3d 299, 301 (La. 2018) (reversing holding that charter school funding was unconstitutional);
State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d at 1160 (rejecting allegations that
charter school funding was unconstitutional); In re Grantof CharterSch. Application ofEnglewood
PalisadesCharterSch., 727 A.2d at 39 (disagreeing that funding scheme was unconstitutional on
its face); Council of Orgs. & Othersfor Educ. About Parochiaid,566 N.W.2d at 211 (upholding
constitutionality of Michigan's charter school act). These suits have been filed by public school
systems, charter schools, public and charter school attendees, and various other groups. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra notes 60, 60, 62. Though such cases have been brought by plaintiffs with varying
and often opposing opinions regarding the "charter school debate," most, if not all, are centered on
the same underlying issue: one group believes it is not receiving the same level of education as the
other as a result of funding disparities between the traditional public schools and the state's charter
schools. See cases cited supra notes 60, 60, 62.
85 See cases cited supra note 84 and accompanying text (claiming that diverting funds from
public schools to charter schools decreases quality of public education).
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6
abundance of such claims, the vast majority have been dismissed.8 In 2015,
the Washington Supreme Court became the first to deem charter schools
Following this ruling, the Washington legislature
unconstitutional."
school act, and in 2018, the Washington Supreme
charter
state's
the
modified
Court found that the new law was, indeed, "constitutional on its face.""
Only one other court, The Court of Appeal of the First Circuit of Louisiana,
has since declared that its state charter school statute was unconstitutional;
89
however, this court's ruling was recently reversed on appeal.
The Washington Supreme Court, in 2015, concluded that the state's
proposed "Charter School Act" was unconstitutional because its treatment of
charter schools as "common schools" violated the language in the
90
Washington State Constitution. The court found that the proposed charter
schools did not fall under the definition of a common school because they
were to be run by "an appointed board or nonprofit organization" and would
not be under the control of "voters of the school district."" The court
stressed that "common school" funds must be protected from what it deemed
an "invasion" by anything falling outside the definition of a common
school.9 2 It went on to specify that the Charter School Act's reallocation of
funds from common schools to the proposed charter schools was precisely
93
the sort of "invasion" that the constitution sought to proscribe. In sum, the
court's holding was rooted in its interpretation of the Washington
Constitution's definition of "common schools" and its belief that the
94
proposed charter schools were not embodied by that definition.

86 See sources cited supranote 64 (confirming consistent failures to challenge constitutionality

of charter school laws).
8 See League of Women Voters of Wash., 355 P.3d at 1133-34 (holding state charter school
funding statute unconstitutional); see also Laura Habein, Note, League of Women Voters v. State:
The Rejection ofPublic andPrivateHybridity Within Washington State PublicSchools, 31 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 201, 201 ("On September 4, 2015, Washington's Supreme Court
became the first in the country to find the taxpayer-funded charter schools unconstitutional.").
88 See El Centro de la Raza v. State, 428 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Wash. 2018) (reviewing
constitutionality of Washington state's modified charter school act.)
89 See Iberville Parish Sch. Bd. v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., No. 2015
CA 1417, 2017 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4, at *13 (2017), rev'd, 248 So. 3d 299, 301 (La. 2018)
(reversing lower court determination that charter school funding was unconstitutional).
9 See League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d at 1135-37 (interpreting constitutional definition of
common schools).
91 See id. at 1137 (using definition of common schools to explain why charter schools cannot
be classified as such).
92 See id. (concluding that funds for common schools must only be used for common schools).
93 See id at 1137-41 (disapproving charter school use of common school funds).
94 See id (looking only to constitution to determine charter school statute was
unconstitutional).
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In accordance with this ruling, the Washington state legislature
amended the Charter School Act in 2016.9 In an attempt to eliminate the
funding issue central to the Washington Supreme Court's 2015 holding, the
new law no longer designates charter schools as common schools.96 In 2018,
upon reviewing the legislature's alterations, the Washington Supreme Court
found that under the new law, charter schools would be funded by the state's
lottery revenue, and no longer "divert[s] restricted common school funds to
support charter schools."97 Thus, the court held that the funding method
described in the modified Charter School Act was constitutional.98
Courts that have dismissed similar claims have routinely stated that
charter school policy determinations are questions for the legislature, never
questioning whether the legislature's classification of charter schools as
"public" schools is actually consistent with the applicable state constitution
.99 Many of these courts have also found that plaintiffs failed to present facts
establishing that the impact of charter school funding on the provision of
education at "traditional" public schools was sufficiently detrimental to be
considered unconstitutional. 0 The Washington Supreme Court, on the
other hand, never "deferred to the legislature" in its 2015 opinion, nor did it

95 See El Centro de la Raza v. State, 428 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Wash. 2018) (summarizing timeline
of legislature's modification of Washington's charter school act).
96 See id at 1146, 1148-49, 1154 (outlining the legislature's alterations).
9 See id. at 1154 (describing modified charter school
funding source).
98 See id at 1154-56 ("[C]harter schools ...
receive no money from the general fund....
therefore, we hold that the Act does not on its face violate [Washington's constitution] by diverting
restricted common school money to charter schools.").
99 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d at 1156 ("[Iln
reviewing these constitutional claims, we must give due deference to the General Assembly."); In
re GrantofCharter Sch. Application ofEnglewood PalisadesCharterSch., 727 A.2d at 27 ("[I]n
interpreting a new statute, a reviewing court must accord substantial deference to the interpretation
by the agency charged with implementing it."); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. About
Parochiaid,566 N.W.2d at 215 ("This Court gives deference to a deliberate act of the Legislature,
and does not inquire into the wisdom of its legislation."). Even the Washington Supreme Court,
which seemed to depart from this line of reasoning in League of Women Voters, distinguished its
role from that of the legislature in El Centro de la Raza, stating, "[1]t is not the province of the court
to express favor or disfavor of the legislature's policy decision to create charter schools. Rather,
our limited role is to determine whether the enacted legislation complies with the requirements of
our state constitution." El Centro de la Raza, 428 P.3d at 1146 (emphasis added).
100 See, e.g., Ohio Cong. ofParents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d at 1160 ("The appellants have
not presented clear and convincing evidence that community schools are raiding local funds that
school districts are otherwise entitled to receive."); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of
Englewood Palisades Charter Sch., 727 A.2d at 27 ("The school district's claim ...
is too
abstract."); Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (dismissing claim that California charter schools were
unconstitutional). "Plaintiffs must demonstrate that choice programs are actually causing or
connected to inadequate or inequitable educational opportunities in particular schools." Black,
supra note 2, at 1416.
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01
Its
evaluate facts evidencing the actual effects of the funding formula.'
state
holding was based solely on the court's own interpretation of the
constitution. 102
Many attempts to persuade state courts that charter school funding
is unconstitutional either allege that charter schools are not truly public and
thus should not be granted funds designated for use by the state's public
school system, or they contend that directing funding away from public
schools for use by charter schools will prevent the affected public schools
from providing students with a constitutionally adequate level of
education."o' The following provides just three examples of such cases: the
first illustrates courts' reluctance to contradict the rule of the legislature,
while the second two demonstrate that plaintiffs who allege charter school
funding adversely effects the overall adequacy of the education provided by
"traditional" public schools must present specific evidence of such injury.
In Council of Organizations & Others for Education About
Parochiaid,Inc. v. Governor, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the distribution of
public funds to charter schools authorized by the Michigan Charter School
Act.' They argued that the charter schools were not public schools because
they were not under the "immediate and exclusive control of the state," and
therefore the funding scheme was unconstitutional under the education
0 6 The Michigan Supreme Court
provisions of the Michigan Constitution.
held that the Charter School Act was constitutional, noting that the Michigan
Constitution does not define the term "public schools," but it does grant the
legislature the responsibility of "maintaining and supporting a system of free
public education," and the legislature had classified the charter schools as

101 See League of Women Voters of Wash., 355 P.3d at 1135 ("This case turns on the language
of article IX, section 2 of our state constitution and this court's case law addressing that
provision."). But see El Centro de la Raza v. State, 428 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Wash. 2018) (stating that
courts do not play role of legislature critic).
102 See League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d at 1135 (citing specific constitutional language).
103 See cases cited supra note 100 (alleging either charter schools are not public or are
detrimental to public education system).
104 See, e.g., Ohio Cong. ofParents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d at 1159 ("[Appellants] allege that
the funding method used to support community schools diverts funds from city school districts,
depriving them of the ability to provide a thorough and efficient system of common schools.");
Council of Orgs. & Othersfor Educ. About Parochiaid,566 N.W.2d at 216 ("[T]he plaintiffs reason
that [charter schools] are not public schools because they were not under the immediate and
exclusive control of the state."); In re Grant of CharterSch. Application of Englewood Palisades
Charter Sch., 727 A.2d at 39 ("Franklin Township argues that the Act is unconstitutional on its
face because its funding scheme-diverting funds away from an existing district in order to pay for
a charter school-will prevent existing districts from meeting their obligation under the State
Constitution to provide a 'thorough and efficient' education.").
'05 566 N.W.2d at 211 (stating plaintiffs' claim and request for injunction).
106 See id. at 216 (expanding on Michigan Constitution's "immediate and exclusive control"
requirement).
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public schools.10 7 The court went on to say that the Michigan Constitution
"does not mandate exclusive. control," but rather only requires that the
legislature "'maintain and support' a system of public schools" and "[t]his
Court gives deference to a deliberate act of the Legislature, and does not
inquire into the wisdom of its legislation.""o' The court did acknowledge
that the constitution required the state to have "general supervision over all
public education," but found that because the state had the power to authorize
and revoke the charters, and could control the allocation of funds to the
schools, the supervision requirement was satisfied. 109
In 1999, three public school districts in New Jersey challenged
various aspects of the New Jersey Charter School Program Act of 1995.110
One district argued that the charter school act was "unconstitutional on its
face" because it permitted the "diver[sion of] funds away from" public
school districts "to pay for. . . charter school[s]," which would "inevitably"
prevent the public districts "from meeting their obligation under the State
Constitution to provide a 'thorough and efficient' education."' The court
responded saying that this claim was abstract, and provisions in the act
providing for funding adjustments to the public schools may very well
alleviate the hypothetical financial problem.112 The court concluded, "[n]ot
until the school has operated for at least a year, or perhaps more, will it be
possible to gauge whether its presence is subverting the district's ability to
provide a constitutionally adequate education for its regular students."ll3
Similarly, in a 2006 challenge to the constitutionality of Ohio's
charter school statute, the plaintiffs alleged that the diversion of funds from
public school districts to charter schools deprived the public schools "of the
ability to provide a thorough and efficient system of common schools." 1 4
The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, stating, "[t]he mere increase or
decrease in the local share percentage does not violate the Thorough and
Efficient Clause [of the Ohio Constitution], because the district still receives
state funding for the children actually attending the district traditional
107

See id. at 219, 222 (confirming constitutionality of statute).

See id. at 215-16 (detailing Michigan's constitutional requirements for statewide public
education system).
109 See id. at 212-14, 221 (quoting MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. VIII, § 3) (opining that state
had sufficient control over charter schools to satisfy constitutional requirements).
108

110 See In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood PalisadesCharter Sch., 727

A.2d at 20-22 (addressing three public school districts' challenges to New Jersey's charter school
act).
'1 See id. at 39 (rejecting claim as "speculative").
112 See id. at 40-41 (finding no merit in future "fiscal doom"
hypothesis).
113 See id. (taking issue with speculative aspects of funding
claim).
114 See State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ.,
857 N.E.2d at

1159 (arguing that per-pupil funding overcomes plaintiffs' funding concerns).
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schools.""s It emphasized that the charter schools were funded on a perpupil basis, and implied that state funds effectively attach to the students,
and not to the school." 6 This implication seemed to assume that the
"traditional" public schools were unlikely to suffer from a loss of funds that
would have hypothetically been used to educate that single student because
when that student leaves to attend a charter school, the public school is no
longer responsible for educating that student.'1 7 The Supreme Court of Ohio,
unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' general assertions that their schools would
lose funding, held that plaintiffs did not "present clear and convincing
118
evidence" that the charter school statute was unconstitutional.
MASSACHUSETTS LAW: ADEQUACY AND DOE NO. 1 V
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
In April of 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the
"SJC"), made its first ever ruling as to the constitutionality of the state's
charter school statute." 9 The plaintiffs, five students who attended Boston
Public Schools, filed a complaint alleging that the Massachusetts charter
school cap prevented them from accessing an "adequate" education, and
therefore violated the education clause and equal protection provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution.1 20 Each student applied to attend at least one
charter school, but none were admitted through the school admissions
lotteries and so had to attend "constitutionally inadequate schools in
Boston."' 2 ' The defendants, Massachusetts' Secretary of Education and

"' See id. at 1160 (claiming per-pupil funding prevents public school from losing funds it was
otherwise entitled to).
116 See id. ("[The state still fulfills its obligation to fund each student at a specific level
according to the statutory formula.").
117 See id. ("When a student leaves a traditional school to attend a [charter] school, the state
funds follow the student.").
' See id. ("The appellants have not presented clear and convincing evidence that community
schools are raiding local funds that school districts are otherwise entitled to receive.").
119 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 244-45 (summarizing claims alleging Massachusetts charter
school cap was unconstitutional).
120 See id. at 250 (providing legislative history of plaintiffs' claims). The plaintiffs in Doe No.
I sought a "declaratory judgment," which "declares conclusively the rights and duties, or the status,
of the parties but involves no executory or coercive relief following as of course." Declaratory
Judgment, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
121 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 250 ("In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought to represent a
class including themselves and all other children attending or assigned to attend constitutionally
inadequate schools in Boston who have applied to public charter schools, but have failed to gain
entry via the lottery.").
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other members of the Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education, filed a motion to dismiss. 122
Prior to plaintiffs' appeal to the SJC, the Suffolk County Superior
Court granted defendants' motion for dismissal as to both of the plaintiffs'
claims. 123 The lower court held that the charter school cap did not violate
Massachusetts' education clause, finding that although the state is obligated
to educate all of its children, there is no "constitutional right to choose a
particular flavor of education" and thus, "denial of access to a particular type
of school providing a particular type of education" did not constitute "the
sort of Statewide abandonment of duty" required for a finding of an
education clause violation. 124 The lower court also held there was no equal
protection violation, finding that the plaintiffs had not established that the
charter school cap was not "rationally related to the furtherance of a
legitimate State interest in providing public education to every child of this
Commonwealth."l 25 The SJC affirmed.1 26
As this case was initiated by charter school proponents who sought
to expand access to charter schools, it may appear distinct from the
discussion regarding claims brought by charter school opponents.1 27 But,
this is the first, and thus far the only Massachusetts case to address a
constitutional challenge relating to charter school legislation, and the SJC's
opinion describes, in detail, the requirements for establishing education
clause and equal protection violations within the charter school context.1 2 8
Accordingly, it will be necessary for future litigants seeking to challenge any
aspect of the Massachusetts charter school statute to understand the court's
holding.1 29
122 See id. (reviewing lower court's allowance of defendant's motion to dismiss de novo).
123 See id. ("The motion judge granted the motion, concluding that, although an actual
controversy between the parties existed and the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against
the defendants, the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under either the education clause or the
equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."); see also Does v. Peyser,
No. 2015-2788, 2016 WL 9738404, at *1 (Mass. Super. Oct. 4, 2016) (granting defendants' motion

to dismiss).
124 See Does, 2016 WL 9738404, at *9 (rejecting plaintiffs' education clause claim).
125 See id. at *9-10 (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection claim).
126 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 244-45 ("We affirm the judgment of dismissal and conclude,

as did the motion judge, that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief under either
provision.").
127 See id. at 244 ("[Plaintiffs] alleg[ed] that the charter school cap under G.L. c. 71 § 89 (i)
violates the education clause and the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution
because the students were not able to attend public charter schools of their choosing.").
128 See id. at 250-59 (detailing elements necessary to successfully state constitutional claims
challenging Massachusetts' charter school statute).
129 See id. (addressing each claim and its elements to highlight requirements for stating valid
claims).
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In Doe No. 1, the SJC first determined whether it had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims. 130 In Massachusetts, when a plaintiff seeks
declaratory relief, a court has jurisdiction if the plaintiff can demonstrate "the
existence of an actual controversy" and "the requisite legal standing to secure
its resolution."l 3 ' Actual controversy exists when a plaintiff has set forth a
"real dispute caused by" one party's assertion of "of a legal relation, status
or right in which he has a definite interest, and the denial of such assertion
by another party also having a definite interest in the subject matter . . ."
Additionally, the circumstances must indicate that "unless the matter is
adjusted," litigation is almost inevitable.133 The SJC found that an actual
controversy existed, explaining that the plaintiffs had an "identifiable
interest in the opportunity to attend a commonwealth charter school" and that
interest was "actually limited" by the charter school cap.' 34
The court also found that the plaintiffs demonstrated standing as to
both constitutional claims."' "A party has standing when it can allege an
injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory scheme, or
constitutional guarantee under which the injurious action has occurred."' 36
A plaintiff will have suffered an injury if the defendant "violated some duty
owed to the plaintiff."1 37 Importantly, the defendant's mere "act or
omission" will not be enough to constitute an injury that justifies standing."
The plaintiffs demonstrated standing as to their alleged injury pursuant to the
education clause of the Massachusetts Constitution-denial of an adequate
public education-because the education clause "imposes a duty on the
Commonwealth to provide an adequate public education to its

130 See id. at 250-51 (asserting that plaintiffs must demonstrate existence of actual controversy
and requisite legal standing).
131 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 251 ("In declaratory judgment actions, both requirements are
liberally construed.").
132 See S. Shore Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Bank Inc., 220 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Mass. 1966) (quoting
Sch. Comm. of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Schs. 70 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Mass. 1946)) (defining
actual controversy); see also Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 251 (referencing S. Shore Nat'! Bank, 220
N.E.2d at 902).
133 See S. Shore Nat'1 Bank, 220 N.E.2d at 902 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Cambridge, 70 N.E.2d
at 300) (defining actual controversy); see also Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 251 (holding plaintiffs
"adequately demonstrated" existence of actual controversy).
134 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 252 (reasoning that because cap inhibited plaintiffs' interest
in attending charter school actual controversy existed).
135 See id. ("The plaintiffs have set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate standing as to both
counts in their complaint.").
136 See id (defining requirement for demonstrating standing).
137 See id. (quoting Penal Insts. Comm'r v. Comm'r of Corr., 416 N.E.2d 958, 962)
(articulating when plaintiffs alleged injury will demonstrate standing).
138 See id. (quoting Penal Insts. Comm'r v. Comm'r of Corr., 416 N.E.2d 958, 962) (further
defining injury).
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schoolchildren." 13 9
Regarding the plaintiffs' equal protection claim,
pursuant to which the alleged injury was "discrimination in the provision of
public education without adequate justification," lawmakers are prohibited
from "treating similarly situated citizens differently without adequate
justification" and therefore plaintiffs had standing.1 4 0
After concluding that the plaintiffs demonstrated both the existence
of an actual controversy and the requisite legal standing, the court proceeded
to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims would survive the motion to
dismiss.14 1 It addressed the education clause claim first. 14 2 To state a claim
under the education clause, it is not enough for the plaintiffs to "plead facts
suggesting [that they were] deprived of an adequate education," but the facts
must also suggest "that the defendants have failed to fulfil their
constitutionally prescribed duty to educate."4 3 To allege that the defendants
have not fulfilled their duty to educate, the facts must "demonstrate that the
Commonwealth's extant public education plan does not provide reasonable
assurance of an opportunity for an education to 'all of its children. . .' over
a reasonable period of time, or is otherwise 'arbitrary, nonresponsive, or
irrational.'""I The court conceded that the plaintiffs were attending schools
where the education provided was, "at the moment, inadequate," but to meet
the requirements for stating a claim under the education clause, they also
needed to show that there was no "reasonable assurance" that their schools
would improve "over a reasonable period of time." 45
Rather than claiming that the Commonwealth's "framework for
ensuring" educational adequacy failed to provide assurance that their schools
would improve over a reasonable period of time, the plaintiffs' sole focus
19 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 252 (confirming plaintiffs demonstrated standing as to
education clause claim because state had duty to educate).
140 See id (confirming plaintiffs' standing as to equal protection because state cannot

discriminate).
141 See id (setting forth conditions for surviving motion to dismiss). "To survive a motion to
dismiss, the facts alleged must 'plausibly suggest[ ] (not merely be consistent with) an entitlement
to relief."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Edwards v. Commonwealth, 76 N.E.3d 248, 254
(Mass. 2017)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level ... [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
in fact)." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890
(Mass. 2008)).
142 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 253 (beginning discussion of education clause claim).
143 See id. (concluding plaintiffs did not plead facts suggesting defendants breached duty to
educate).
144 See id (quoting Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Mass. 2005);
McDuffy v. Sec'y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993)) (characterizing
elements necessary to show Commonwealth's failure to fulfill duty to educate).
145 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.2d at 254 ("[T]here maybe moments in time where particular public
schools are not providing an adequate education to their students... . This alone is insufficient to
support a claim that the Commonwealth has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation.").
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was on the charter school cap and their inability to leave the public school
system. 146 The court emphasized that "there is no constitutional entitlement
to attend charter schools, and the plaintiffs' complaint [did] not suggest that
charter schools are the Commonwealth's only plan for ensuring that the
education in the plaintiffs' schools will be adequate."' 4 7 Thus, the court
found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the education clause.1 4 8
The court proceeded to discuss the plaintiffs' equal protection
claim. 14' The plaintiffs claimed that the charter school cap "create[d] two
classes of children: those who [were] guaranteed to receive an opportunity
for an adequate education because all traditional public schools in their
districts provide[d] one, and those in districts with many failing schools
whose educational prospects [were] determined by a lottery."so The court
did not decide whether the charter school statute was discriminatory for the
purposes of an equal protection analysis, but found that even assuming that
it was discriminatory, the plaintiffs' claim would not survive the motion to
dismiss.'
Before it could evaluate whether the plaintiffs alleged facts that
"plausibly suggested" an equal protection violation, the court had to consider
the applicable standard of review.' 52 If a statute "burdens a fundamental
right or targets a suspect class," the court will review the statute with "strict
scrutiny."l53 Otherwise, the statute will be subject to "rational basis
146 See id. at 255 (acknowledging inadequacy of education provided by plaintiffs' schools).
147 See id. (affirming lower court's dismissal of education clause claim.). "The education
clause provides a right for all the Commonwealth's children to receive an adequate education, not
a right to attend charter schools.... [T]he clause does not permit courts to order 'fundamentally
political' remedies or 'policy choices that are properly the Legislature's domain."' Id. (quoting
Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156-57). "There may be any number of equally effective options that
also could address the plaintiffs' concerns; however, each would involve policy considerations that
must be left to the Legislature." Id
148 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 255 ("Whether to divert an increased amount of school district
funds from traditional public schools to charter schools to comply with the education clause
mandate is a choice for the Legislature, not for the courts.").
149 See id. (addressing equal protection claim).
`0 See id. (describing plaintiffs' assertion that charter school cap created two classes of
children).
151 See id. (concluding plaintiffs did not state plausible claim for purposes of equal protection).
On its face, the net school spending cap operates in a way to encourage more commonwealth charter
schools in the plaintiffs' school district than in higher performing districts. ... Under the plaintiffs'
theory of discriminatory injury, they are part of the advantaged class associated with the statute's
facial discrimination, and likely would not have standing to challenge it.
Id. at 255, n.28.
152 See id. at 256 (explaining differences in application of strict scrutiny compared to rational
basis review).
153 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 256 (providing circumstances when strict scrutiny is
appropriate standard of review).
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review."54 The charter school statute did not target a suspect class, but the
plaintiffs argued that strict scrutiny should still apply because the statute did
burden the "fundamental right to education protected by the Massachusetts
Constitution.""' However, the SJC has yet to decide whether the education
clause imparts a fundamental right under the circumstances presented in this
case. 15 6 The court declined to resolve this question, finding that even if
education was a fundamental right, the charter school cap did not warrant
heightened scrutiny.'
A statute burdens a fundamental right only if it "significantly
interferes" with that right.' Here, the court did not believe that the charter
school cap significantly interfered with the right to education.159 It reiterated
that there is not a constitutional right to attend charter schools, adding that
"the charter school cap [did] not interfere with the students' ability to attend
traditional public schools."l60 In sum, even where there is a right to obtain
an education, and even if that right is fundamental, there is no right to attend
a charter school, and therefore, under this set of facts it would have been
impossible for the court to find that the charter school cap interfered with the
plaintiffs' right to an education as they were still able to attend public
schools.16' Like their education clause claim, the plaintiffs' focus on the
constitutionality of the cap, and not on the inadequacy of the education at
their public schools, resulted in their failure to state a claim.1 62
154 See id at 257 (indicating where strict scrutiny is inapplicable, the court turns to rational
basis review).
155 See id. at 256 (declining to determine whether education is fundamental right in
Massachusetts).
156 See id. (stating that it has not held whether and when education is fundamental right).

We have had occasion to hold that the Massachusetts Constitution does not guarantee
each individual student the fundamental right to an education in circumstances in which
a student's behavior leads to expulsion.... Although heightened scrutiny does not apply
in the individual student misconduct context, whether the education clause implies
heightened scrutiny of education-related discriminatory classifications in other
circumstances is an open question. We need not determine whether such circumstances
exist and, if so, what they might be, in order to conclude that heightened scrutiny does
not apply to the charter school cap statute.
Id.

157 See id. (opining that state had not interfered with plaintiffs' right to education).
158 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 256 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978))
(specifying extent of burden on fundamental right required for strict scrutiny).
159 See id. at 257 (agreeing with lower court's assertion that there is no constitutional right to
attend charter schools).
160 See id. (confirming that strict scrutiny would not apply to plaintiffs).
161 See id (reiterating charter school cap has no impact on general ability to obtain
public
education).
162 See id. at 256-57 (addressing application of rational basis review in this case).

70

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

"

A law will be upheld under rational basis review "as long as it is
rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate state interest."163
Additionally, an equal protection analysis under the Massachusetts
Constitution "requires the court to look carefully at the purpose to be served
by the statute in question and at the degree of harm to the affected class."
Further, the court must evaluate whether "an impartial lawmaker could
logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged
class."1 65 In applying this standard of review, the court acknowledged that
although the charter school cap did not burden any fundamental right, the
cap may still "impose a serious degree of harm on the plaintiffs . . . given the
nature of the educational interest at stake." 16 6 Despite this potential harm,
the court opined that "the purposes of the charter school cap reflect[ed] a
legislative attempt to balance the plaintiffs' strong educational interest" with
the education interests of those students who do not attend charter schools. 167
Accordingly, the court believed that the purpose of the cap transcended any
harm it may have caused the plaintiffs, concluding "that no plausible set of
6
facts exist to overcome the statute's presumption of rationality." s
To conclude, this opinion not only explained why the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the charter school cap violated the education clause or
the equal protection rights within the Massachusetts Constitution, but it also
169
The SJC
illustrated what would be necessary for such claims to succeed.
outlined the requirements for each claim and even characterized the

163 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 257 (quoting English v. New England Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d
329, 332 (Mass. 1989)) (defining application of rational basis review).
16 See id. at 257 (quoting English, 541 N.E.2d at 333) (highlighting need to balance purpose
of statute with harm it causes).
See id. at 257 (quoting English, 541 N.E.2d at 333) (expanding on application of rational
16
basis review).
166 See id. at 257 (returning to issue of statute's degree of harm to affected class).
167 See id. at 258 (listing various reasons that provide rational basis for charter school statute).
As the Superior Court judge noted in this case, funding for charter schools necessarily affects the
funding for traditional public schools. The cap is an effort to allocate education funding among all
the Commonwealth's students attending these two types of publicly funded schools. Because of
the statutory funding mechanism that mandates payment of charter school tuition from resources
that would otherwise go to traditional public schools, the expansion of charter schools has
detrimental effects on traditional public schools and the students who rely on those schools and
their services.... This attempt to allocate resources among all the Commonwealth's students
represents the rational basis for the statutory cap.
Id.
168 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d. at 258 (determining plaintiffs' claims did not survive rational
basis review).
169 See id. at 250-59 (describing how to state valid claim under applicable constitutional
provisions).
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legislative interests at stake.1 7 0 Furthermore, it is not impossible to overcome
such interests, but the standard is high, and a plaintiff must plead facts
plausibly suggesting that an actual constitutional right has been violated, that
the violation is unlikely to be cured within a reasonable period of time, and
the resulting harm must be such that it cannot be justified or overcome by
the legislative interests at play. 171
Future Challenges to the ConstitutionalityofMassachusetts Charter
School Laws
Despite the evidently widespread concern that charter school
funding disrupts the quality, and equality, of education provided by state
public education systems, the majority of claims addressing such concerns
have been unsuccessful.' 72 But, courts' consistent refusals to deem charter
school statutes unconstitutional seems to be the product of advocates who
assert broad claims rarely supported by specific evidence.1 73
At the federal level, Equal Protection claims fail because evidence
of discriminatory intent is lacking.' 74 Arguments that public schools are
treated differently from charter schools, or that certain schools have a
seemingly disproportionate number of minority students compared to others,
will not survive the high standard that must be met for an equal protection
claim to hold any merit. 175 It may be that in the context of challenges to the
constitutionality of charter school laws, federal equal protection claims will
rarely, if ever, succeed, as there is no fundamental right to education, and in
the absence of true discrimination, the standard of review is unlikely to rise

170 See id. (illustrating elements of each claim).
171 See id. at 259 ("Where a statute does not use a suspect classification or burden a

fundamental right, is supported by a rational basis, and does not otherwise violate the Constitution,
advocates may not turn to the courts merely because they are unsatisfied with the results of the
political process.").
172 See Black, supra note 2, at 1414 ("Prior litigation, on the whole, has been
a failure. Even
the rare victories have been cut short by legislative work-arounds. The flaw of the litigation may
be that it simply claims too much-that state constitutions prohibit charters ... entirely."); Martin,
supra note 9, at 102 ("It seems clear that the outcome of charter school cases decided in state and
federal courts have not served as a significant derailment to the growth of the charter school
movement.").
13 See cases cited supra note 62, 64 (providing examples of plaintiffs unable to persuade
courts due to vague evidence); see also Black supra note 2, at 1415-17 (theorizing that plaintiffs
must make precise showing of charter schools' harm to public education).
174 See cases cited supra note 62 (listing cases where courts rejected federal
equal protections
claims).
17 See sources cited supra note 62 (exemplifying that broad assertions
cannot support equal
protection claims).
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to the level of "strict scrutiny.""' Thus, under the assumption that these
challenges will almost always be subject to rational basis review, it also
seems likely that federal courts will tend to find that the law in question is
rationally related to the governmental interest in furthering educational
77
opportunities.1
78
At the state level, however, there may be more hope.1 Though the
majority of charter school claims to date have failed in state courts, it seems
that these cases, more so even than those heard in federal courts, were
unsuccessful because of the broad, sometimes hypothetical, and often
79
Further, the SJC's opinion in Doe No.
polemical assertions of plaintiffs.'
I delineated, in rather precise terms, how to establish constitutional
violations under the education clause and equal protection provisions of the
Thus, this case may not only be used as
Massachusetts Constitution.'s
precedent, but it can help guide future plaintiffs who may wish to challenge
the constitutionality of Massachusetts' charter school statutes.'
Below, the description of a hypothetical claim will exemplify how
Doe No. 1 may help guide future challenges to the constitutionality of
82
But first, recent changes to the
Massachusetts charter school laws.
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
83
When the
("DESE") school "accountability system" must be noted.'
184
plaintiffs in Doe No. I filed their claim, DESE classified schools by level.

176 See sources cited supra note 62 (requiring strong evidence of discriminatory intent, and

actual discriminatory impact).
177 See sources cited supra note 62 (revealing federal courts tend to find legitimate
governmental purpose for charter school statutes).
" See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 250-59 (providing in-depth clarification of elements required
to challenge education laws); see also League of Women Voters of Wash., 355 P.3d at 1141
(striking down charter school act due to unconstitutional funding); Black, supra note 2, at 1416
("The state's motivations and rationale for its policies are irrelevant if the net result is a failure to
provide appropriate educational opportunities. A court might strike down the implementation of a
charter system and demand reform in the same way that it has struck down state funding formulas
and demanded that they be rewritten. In doing so, courts do not preclude any particular form of
school funding or school choice; courts simply demand that the state's chosen policies produce
outcomes consistent with the constitution.").
179 See cases cited supra note 94 (listing state level charter school claims attempting to
persuade courts with little evidentiary support).
.so See 95 N.E.3d at 250-59 (taking reader through each claim step by step).
181 See id. (outlining required elements of education clause and equal protection claims).
182 See id. (providing "guide" for similar claims).

183 See Summary of the Next-Generation District and School Accountability System, MASS.
DEP'T

OF

ELEMENTARY

&

SECONDARY

EDUC.

1,

1-9,

(follow "Summary of the Nexthttp://www.doe.mass.edu/accountability/lists-tools.html
Generation District and School Accountability System" hyperlink under "General Information")
(last updated June 2018).
184 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 249, n.17 (describing Massachusetts' classification of schools
based on performance); see also Summary of the Next-Generation District and School
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At that time, schools that were ranked level four and five were among the
worst performing schools in the state, and therefore were generally
considered to provide inadequate levels of education.'
Since the
publication of the Doe No. I opinion, however, DESE updated its
"accountability system."l86 Instead of assigning a numeric level to each
Massachusetts school, DESE will now place each school into one of two
general categories: "schools requiring assistance or intervention," and
"schools not requiring assistance or intervention."" Within each of these
two broad categories, a school will also be placed into an "accountability
category" depending on its academic performance as evaluated by DESE.18
There are two accountability categories for schools that "require assistance
or intervention": (1) schools "in need of broad/comprehensive support" and
(2) schools "in need of focused/targeted support."l8 9
The
"broad/comprehensive support" category falls at the lowest end of the
performance spectrum under DESE guidelines, while the "focused/targeted
support" category, though still low on the spectrum, requires evidence of
stronger academic performance. 190 Of the schools that do not "require
assistance or intervention," DESE will place those deemed to have exhibited
the highest level of performance in the "schools of recognition"
accountability category.1 91 The remaining "schools that do not require
Accountability System, supra note 183, at 1 (providing background on Massachusetts' formerly
used assessment system).
185 See id. (briefing school ranking system).
186 See Summary ofthe Next-Generation DistrictandSchool Accountability System, supra
note
183, at I (explaining Massachusetts' newly implemented school assessment system). This Note
does not detail the specific factors that DESE analyzes when assessing school performance, as it is
not particularly relevant to this discussion. The summary of Massachusetts' new school
classification system is included in the text to provide the reader with the current language
associated with Massachusetts school performance. Furthermore, the Note's description of a
hypothetical challenge to the constitutionality of Massachusetts charter school laws must use
language that is accurate and up-to-date if it is to be realistic and convincing. Thus, an in-depth
discussion of the particulars of the Massachusetts' assessment system is not necessary, and the brief
overview provided is sufficient for the purpose of this Note.
187 See Summary ofthe Next-Generation DistrictandSchool Accountability System, supranote
183, at 7-8 (defining classifications used for Massachusetts' school assessments).
1
See id. at 8 (detailing additional categories used to indicate school's performance).
1 See id. at 7-8 (listing "accountability" categories for "schools requiring assistance or
intervention")
" See id at 8 (providing chart summarizing differences between each accountability
category); see also Massachusetts'New School and DistrictAccountability System, MASS. DEP'T
OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (2018), http://www.doe.mass.edu/accountability/liststools.html (follow "One-Page Summary of Massachusetts' Accountability System - For Parents"
hyperlink under "General Information") (showing image of school performance spectrum
according to accountability categories).
191 See School Leader's Guide to the 2018 Accountability Determinations, MASS. DEP'T OF
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., http://www.doe.mass.edu/accountability/lists-tools.html
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assistance" will be categorized as either "meeting targets" or "partially
meeting targets." 192
Though DESE has not analogized these accountability categories to
the formerly used numeric levels, for the purposes of the following
hypothetical, it seems fair to say that schools deemed to "require assistance
or intervention" would likely have been classified as level four or five
schools.193 Thus, assume the hypothetical plaintiff attends a public school in
Massachusetts that "requires assistance or intervention," and thus performs
at a level equivalent to the level four and five schools described in Doe No.
1.194 She would like to challenge the constitutionality of Massachusetts
charter school funding, asserting that she is not only receiving an inadequate
education, but funding initially designated for use by her public school was
diverted to charter schools and has inhibited her school's ability to obtain
resources necessary for improvement. 195 Assuming the plaintiff has
statistical evidence that the charter school funding has actually contributed
to the inadequacy of her school, she may succeed if she follows the path laid
by the SJC in Doe No. 1.196
First, Doe No. I established that the standard for establishing
jurisdiction is fairly low."' Plaintiff would likely be able to show that an
actual controversy existed, as she attends an underperforming school and is
claiming that charter school funding impeded her access to an adequate
198
education because it prevented her school from improving academically.
Thus, her identifiable interest in obtaining an adequate education is impeded
by Massachusetts' charter school funding scheme. 199 She would likely have
(follow "School Leader's Guide to the 2018 Accountability Determinations hyperlink under
"Supporting Materials") (last updated Sept. 26, 2018) (expanding on criterion used to assess
"schools of recognition); see also Summary of the Next-Generation District and School
Accountability System, supra note 183, at 8 (summarizing "schools of recognition" accountability
category).
192 See Summary ofthe Next-GenerationDistrict andSchool Accountability System, supra note
183, at 8 (listing "accountability" categories for "schools not requiring assistance or intervention")
193 Compare Summary of the Next-Generation District and School Accountability System,
supra note 183, at 7-8 (outlining when schools will "require assistance or intervention" "schools of
recognition" accountability category), with Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 249, n.17 (explaining when
school performance would warrant level four or five designation).
194 See sources cited, supra note 193 and accompanying text (comparing updated school
assessment system with the previous classification system).
195 See Black supra note 2, at 1363 (asserting that charter school funding actually threatens
quality of public school education).
196 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 250-59 (delineating elements of successful claims).
197 See id. at 251 (confirming both actual controversy and standing are liberally construed).
198 See id. (finding actual controversy existed where access to adequate education was

inhibited by statute).
'9
See id. at 252 (stating identifiable interest was opportunity to attend Commonwealth charter
school).

2019]

MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOL LEGISLATION

75

standing under both the education clause and equal protection provisions of
the Massachusetts Constitution.20 0 Under the education clause, her injury,
an inadequate public education, is within the constitution's area of concern
as it imposes a duty on the state to provide an adequate public education to
all children.201 Under the equal protection principles of the constitution, her
injury, like that in Doe No. 1, would be "discrimination in the provision of
public education without adequate justification." 2 0 2
Next, under the education clause, this plaintiff would allege that her
assignment to an inadequate school is caused by charter school funding. 20 3
As explained above, she would likely succeed in proving that she has been
deprived of an adequate education, but whether defendants have failed to
fulfill their constitutionally prescribed duty to educate is a bit trickier.20
This plaintiffs situation is different from that of the plaintiffs in Doe No. 1,
as they had no constitutional right to attend a charter school, whereas this
plaintiff has a right to attend a constitutionally adequate public school.20 5
But, this plaintiff would still have to establish that the Commonwealth's
"extant public education plan does not provide reasonable assurance of an
opportunity for an adequate education . . over a reasonable period of
time."20 6 Under the assumption that she has data to support the contention
that charter school funding is actually preventing her school from improving
and causing it to remain inadequate, she could argue that as long as the state
continues to fund charter schools by reallocating funds from public schools,
her school will continue to provide an inadequate education. Thus, it is
possible the court could find that under the current funding scheme, there is
no reasonable assurance of an opportunity for her to receive an adequate
education over a reasonable period of time.207
As for the equal protection claim, the plaintiff may argue that the
charter school funding method creates two classes of children: those who
attend schools with funding sufficient for providing an adequate education,
200 See id. ("A party has standing when it can allege an injury within the area of concern of the
statute, regulatory scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious action has
occurred.").
201 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 252 (concluding plaintiffs' alleged injury fell within area of
concern of education clause).
202 See id (defining plaintiffs' equal protection injury).
203 See id. at 253 (finding charter school cap caused assignment to inadequate school).
204 See id. (requiring that plaintiff plead facts suggesting deprivation of adequate education
and state's failure to educate).
205 See id. at 255 (stating that there is no right to attend charter schools).
206 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 254 (demonstrating reasonable assurance requirement).
207 See id (asserting education clause claims cannot succeed if reasonable assurance of
adequate education over reasonable time). "[T]here may be moments in time where particular
public schools are not providing an adequate education to their students." Id
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and those who attend failing schools that are unable to improve as a result of
charter school funding.2 08 A court would be unlikely to apply strict scrutiny,
as education has not been deemed a fundamental right in Massachusetts, and
20 9
in this case, the charter school funding does not target a suspect class.
2 10
A court
However, the plaintiff s claim may survive rational basis review.
charter
the
enacting
for
would likely find that the governmental purpose
school statute was to create innovative alternatives to the state's traditional
public school system with the hopes of improving the overall quality of
public education. 2 1 1 But, this plaintiffs specific, statistical evidence that
charter school funding detrimentally impacts the quality of education that
her school can provide, may persuade the court that the degree of harm to
the provision of adequate public education outweighs the governmental
212
purpose to be served by the charter school statute. If the court is persuaded
that the plaintiffs school cannot improve so long as charter schools are
allocated funds from public districts, then it would be unlikely to conclude
2 13
that the governmental purpose transcends the harm it is causing.
It may not be impossible to successfully challenge charter school
legislation, but claims have to be strategic, and evidence has to be grounded
214
Of course, the
in specific facts that leave little to no room for dispute.
the preceding
in
described
success
hypothetical plaintiff may not find the
paragraphs, but she does make a pretty convincing argument.

208 See id. at 255 (setting forth plaintiffs' claim that charter school cap creates two classes of
children).
209 See id. at 256 (stating strict scrutiny is only appropriate if statute burdens fundamental right
or targets suspect class).
210 See id at 257 (conveying that court considers degree of harm caused by statute in addition
to state interest).
211 See Doe No. 1, 95 N.E.3d at 257 (providing governmental purpose for charter school
creation). "The Legislature first created charter schools as laboratories only twenty-five years ago
to accomplish purposes such as 'simulat[ing] the development of innovative programs within
public education' and 'provid[ing] models for replication in other public schools."' Id. (alterations
in original) (quoting ALM GL c. 71 § 89 (b)).
212 See id. (discussing evidence necessary to show significant harm).
213 See id at 257-58 (highlighting consideration of whether statute's legitimate public purpose
transcends harm).
214 See Black, supra note 2, at 1425 ("The conceptually and factually more direct challenge
to choice programs is that they impede the delivery of constitutionally required public education
opportunities. Again, the claim is not that charters or vouchers are per se barred, but that as a
practical matter, the state's statutory structure for choice programs is undermining public education.
This claim requires evidence of the precise effects of choice on public education in particular
locations.").
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CONCLUSION
Proving to a court that charter school laws are unconstitutional will
never be an easy task, but it may be possible. This is a developing area of
legislation that inevitably needs some fine tuning, but legal precedent has
already revealed some of the adjustments that need to be made. Broad
allegations that lack specific evidence will not prevail. However, specific
data, actual statistics, and evidence of the impact of specific charter schools
on specific public schools all have the potential to change the course of these
constitutional challenges. Furthermore, hostile arguments conveying an
anti-charter school attitude will not help the cause. Attacking charter schools
as an institution may be tempting for those who oppose school choice reform,
but for change to occur, more strategic and focused methods must be sought.
Perry Gans

